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This paper empirically tests recent theoretical explanations on the individual aspects of
people who trust or distrust institutions. Based on recent literature in political sociolo-
gy, I hypothesize that social capital as well as cultural values should affect people’s ten-
dency to put confidence in political or civil institutions. Individual-level survey data
from several sources covering periods between 1981 and 2003 are analyzed to test
whether and how people’s social capital and cultural values affect their level of institu-
tional confidence.
The results from regression models show that social trust and social participation, two
aspects of social capital, tend to have positive effects on confidence in both public and
civic institutions. Significance of effects varies by year and is more pronounced for pub-
lic institutions. Post-materialist value has negative effect on confidence in public insti-
tutions, but has no significant effect on confidence in civic institutions. Despite some
variance in statistical significance of the effects, the relationship between independent
and dependent variables appears consistent across surveys.
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INTRODUCTION
Why don’t people trust government? Nye and colleagues (1997; 2001)
raised this key question in their diagnosis of what is wrong with American
political institutions. The question dates back to the early 1970s, when
Miller (1974) warned of increasing political cynicism and distrust among cit-
izens. Lipset and Schneider (1987) analyzed historical trends of declining
political trust, comparing business, labor and government. They maintained
that a “confidence gap” existed across diverse institutional sectors in
America and that the gap had been widening since the 1960s. According to
Nye and colleagues, only one-fourth of Americans trusted their government
at the end of the 1990s, while in the mid-1960s, three fourths of Americans
trusted the government. Concerns about declining public confidence in both
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political and civil institutions begin with the assumption that support and
trust are essential for the functioning of institutions in a democratic society.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States is not the
only country concerned with declining public confidence in institutions. In
their edited volume comparing public attitudes toward democracy in the
U.S., European countries, and Japan, Pharr and Putnam (2000) reported that
declining institutional confidence plagued almost all the tri-lateral coun-
tries. They summarize this situation as “disaffected democracies.” It is ironic
that democracies face strong internal threat by lessening confidence among
citizens, when they are ready to announce victory over external enemies.
The situation is even worse for the countries that are recently democra-
tized. Recent studies show that post-communist societies suffer from lack of
public confidence in institutions, especially political institutions (Mishler
and Rose 1997; 2001). In Poland, for example, people’s confidence in parlia-
ment and government, which once showed a high level of 85 and 65 percent
between 1989 and 1993, dramatically fell to a low of 20 percent within five
years (Sztompka, 1999). South Korea provides another case of rapid decline
in public confidence in political and civil institutions (Kim, 2002). According
to the World Value Survey results, Koreans’confidence in parliament
declined from 70 to 15 percent between 1981 and 2001, while confidence in
courts and civil servants declined from 80 to 45 percent during the same
period. Survey results show that Korean “democracy in the aftermath of
democratization” (Choi, 2002) shows symptoms of general crises.
Since the mid-1990s, South Korea faced self-defeating consequences
emerging from the very mechanism credited for the explosive economic
growth. According to Chang (1999), patriarchal political authoritarianism,
chaebol’s despotic and monopolistic business practices, abuse and exclusion
of labour, neglect of basic welfare rights, ubiquitous physical dangers, and
ideological self-negation are all examples of such hazardous consequences
from compressed modernity in South Korea. It is not surprising that confi-
dence in institutions should dwindle when individuals find those institu-
tions incapable of coping with such pervasive problems. In this respect,
decline in institutional confidence could be attributable to the malfunction
or dysfunction of those institutions and consequent loss in trustworthiness.
Therefore, it is crucial to understand the nature of institutional arrangement,
and to evaluate institutional performance in order to explain the changing
level of institutional confidence among people.
In this paper, however, I am more interested in the individual aspects of
individuals who trust or distrust institutions. Much recent research has
shown that social capital, as well as cultural values, should affect the ten-
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dency to put confidence in political or civil institutions (Nye, 1997, 2001;
Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Rapid changes that Korean society has experi-
enced at the macro-level should have concurrent changes at the micro-level
in individual psyches and culture. In other words, Koreans’ habits of heart
should have been largely shaped by the macro social changes. Patterns of
social interaction and relationships among people should also reflect the
structural changes in polity, economy and society. Therefore, one can say
that social capital and cultural values deserve due credit for affecting confi-
dence in institutions.
I use survey data from several sources, covering periods between 1981
and 2003 to examine whether and how social capital and cultural values
affect the level of institutional confidence. I begin with conceptual issues of
institutional confidence, and then review theoretical backgrounds on social
capital and cultural values. Next, I present hypotheses on the impact of
social capital and cultural values on the level of institutional confidence.
Descriptions of data and analytical methods follow, and results from statisti-
cal analyses are presented. I conclude with discussions on the implications
of the findings and limitations of this study. 
CONCEPTUALIZING INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE
According to Earle and Cvetkovich (1995), only “inter-personal trust” can
be meaningfully defined; all the other forms of trust are derivative in that
they cannot be based on face-to-face commitment. However, many social
scientists apply the concept of trust in diverse situations other than interper-
sonal relations. They would probably agree with Barber (1983: 18), who
argued that “we may usefully think of these various kinds of trust as exist-
ing not only between individual actors, but also between individuals and
systems. Applying Fukuyama’s (1995) concept of “radius” of trust,
Sztompka (1999) maintained that we can theorize trust at multiple levels,
starting from interpersonal relations to social categories (such as race, gen-
der, or religion), social roles (such as parents or occupations), social groups
(such as cabinets, sports teams, or work groups), institutions or organiza-
tions (such as armies, churches, courts, police, or banks), technical systems
(such as transportation, communication, or stock trading systems), and
finally reaching entire societies or social order. According to Sztompka,
institutional trust stands in the mid of the continuum ranging from the
interpersonal to the societal level. In this reasoning, institutional trust is dis-
tinguished from interpersonal trust only in its scope or level. The internal
logic of trust remains the same whether it applies to relations between per-
INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE IN KOREA 167
sons or to relations between person and institutions. 
Hardin (2002) criticized the view that various concepts of trust differ only
by their level or radius of application as too simplistic. We can summarize
his argument as follows. Those who view trust from a normative or non-
rational perspective regard trust as one-part or two-part relations in nature.
Here, a one-part relation implies that trust depends only on the disposition
of the trusting person, and two-part relations imply that the relationship
between the trusting person and the trustee determine trust. Trust, however,
is more complex and conditional, and should be regarded as a three-part
relation, where A trusts B to do X. In this sense, trust can be seen as “encap-
sulated interest.” This means that the trusted person should have enough
motivation and interest to satisfy the expectation of the trusting person. It is
assumed that the trusting person has options to affect the behavior or deci-
sion of the trusted person, and that the information and knowledge neces-
sary for making a decision is available to the trusting person.
Hardin rejected the concept of institutional trust mainly on the grounds
that trust relationships as defined above cannot exist between a person and
institutions. As the relationship between a person and institutions or organi-
zations is asymmetric in nature (Coleman, 1990), an individual person can-
not have comprehensive information on how institutions or organizations
are administered, nor have leverage to pursue his/her own interest against
institutions or organizations. Therefore, when an individual puts trust in a
certain institution, it cannot be more than just having a general expectation
about the institution. If an individual person can show general expectation
without leverage to pursue his/her interest, it is better to call it confidence
rather than trust. 
Luhmann (1988) also made a conceptual distinction between confidence
and trust. According to him, both familiarity and confidence assume asym-
metric relationships between system and environment, and especially, confi-
dence has much to do with such institutions as religion, politics, or law,
which appear in the course of adapting to danger or contingency. In con-
trast, trust appears only in modern society, where danger is replaced by risk,
and it concerns internal calculation of external conditions inducing risk.
Following Luhmann and Hardin, Heimer (2001) clarified a family of con-
cepts relating to trusting relationships in a table.
Heimer added ‘faith’ and ‘legal trust’ to Luhmann’s distinction between
confidence and trust. To the extent that a person believes that the trustee is
certain to act in his/her interest, and continues to believe this, despite infor-
mation about conflicts of interest or evidence of the hostility or indifference
of the trustee, then he/she is acting on the basis of faith. In trust relations
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falling into the category of legal trust, a person may feel vulnerable and
uncertain about the trustee’s intentions and competence, and may know
that a specific person is supposed to listen to complaints on these subjects,
but discover that no one will do more than listen. Such a situation is similar
to legal arrangement of a trust, where a trustee’s obligations are legally
fixed and not subject to negotiation. The pure form of legal trust is excep-
tional in reality (Heimer, 2001: 47-8). 
Heimer did not directly link such conceptual typology to the distinction
between objects of trust. However, we can infer from Luhmann’s and
Hardin’s expositions that the distinction between confidence and trust cor-
responds to the distinction between institutions or corporate actors and
individual actors as objects of trust. When the object is an abstract entity
such as society in general, certain institutions, or social categories, which are
difficult to specify concrete relationships with, then the relationship is prone
to be faith or confidence. On the other hand, if the object is more concrete in
nature, such that we can make specific relationships with, then the relation-
ship tends to be legal trust or trust. In this study, I intentionally use the con-
cept of confidence to emphasize the asymmetry in influence and informa-
tion between an individual citizen and public or civic institutions. Although
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TABLE 1. THE FAMILY OF TRUST RELATIONS
Faith Confidence Legal Trust Trust/Distrust
1. vulnerability-entrustors ○ ○ ○ ○
have something of value that
can be or must be entrusted
2. uncertainty-entrustors ○ ○ ○
recognize their vulnerability 
and the disparity between 
their interests and those of 
trustees/and see that outcomes of
interactions are uncertain
3. Trustees or trustees’ agents ○ ○
acknowledge obligation to listen 
to complaints about entrustors’
uncertainty and vulnerability
4. Entrustors have the right to try to ○
influence trustees or alter situation
Source: Heimer (2001), p. 46.
citizens recognize that their interests depend on the performance of institu-
tions and competence of incumbents, they are constrained in their capacity
to directly influence the arrangement of institutions. Therefore, people’s
level of confidence in institutions reflects their experiences with institutions
and also their social and cultural value orientations. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE
Recently, scholars in sociology, economics, and political science have con-
verged on the concept of “social capital” as a comprehensive explanation for
why some communities are able to resolve collective problems cooperative-
ly while others are unable to bring people together for common purposes
(Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam, 1993). Scholarly interest in social
capital has been largely motivated by the linkage between the levels of
social capital and collective outcomes; high levels of social capital appear to
be crucial for such measures of collective well-being as economic develop-
ment, effective political institutions, and low crime (Fukuyama, 1995;
Putnam, 1993).
Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993) postulated social capital as a property
of communities. However, social capital as collective property should have
its micro-foundation at the individual level. After all, it is not a “communi-
ty” that participates or builds trust, but the people who comprise that com-
munity who belong to civic organizations and acquire positive feelings
towards others. Brehm and Rahn (1997) regarded social capital as an aggre-
gate concept that has its basis in individual behavior, attitudes, and predis-
positions. More specifically, they argue that social capital manifests itself in
individuals as a tight, reciprocal relationship between levels of civic engage-
ment and interpersonal trust.
Brehm and Rahn (1997) postulated that confidence in institutions should
be seen as an outcome of social capital processes. According to them, inter-
personal trust and civic engagement, which jointly comprise social capital,
contribute to an individual’s confidence in institutions. People who trust
others have greater confidence in political and civic institutions. Because
misanthropes doubt that others have benign intentions, they may believe
that everyone is a potential cheater. People with a high degree of trust, on
the other hand, do not fear that they will be taken advantage of by follow-
ing the rules because they expect that others will follow them also.
Therefore, people who expect that others will comply with authorities find
it easier to accept the decisions of authorities. Such compliance is of funda-
mental importance for the government, because it means that political
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authorities have less need to rely upon enforcement and coercion to control
citizen’s behavior.
Tocqueville (1954) favorably regarded the “art of association” as an
important remedy in combating the government’s centralizing tendencies.
According to him, people who learned the virtues of self-interest through
association with others would be less likely to look to the state for their
needs and more likely to resist the temptations of centralization. However,
the negative relationship between the level of civic participation and institu-
tional confidence expected from Tocqueville’s argument could be offset by
the positive effect of civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963) or social capital
(Putnam 1993) fostered by widespread civic participation. Putnam (1993)
distinguished between horizontally organized (where all members are basi-
cally equal) and vertically organized (where power relations are hierarchi-
cal) associations, and argued that while horizontally organized associations
build social capital and promote institutional confidence, vertically orga-
nized associations do not build social capital and many undermine it, lead-
ing to low levels of institutional confidence.
From the above discussion, I expect that social capital and social partic-
ipation would have positive effects on the level of confidence in both public
and civic institutions.
POST-MATERIALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE
Inglehart (1990; 1997) revived the culturalist tradition in the study of
democracy initiated by Verba and Almond (1963). According to him, when
there is sufficient economic development to provide for the basic material
needs of the population, then societies experience several changes in cultur-
al values that are conducive to democracy. As service sectors and education-
al opportunities broaden, two changes particularly stand out: cognitive
mobilization and a shift from materialist to post-materialist values.
Cognitive mobilization is an increase in the skills and the motivation
required to engage in decision-making, including political decision making.
According to Inglehart (1990), it is a byproduct of economic development
because higher levels of education and service-sector employment raise a
population’s level of cognitive mobilization. According to Inglehart (1997:
330), persons in service sectors “become accustomed to thinking for them-
selves,” and thus cognitive mobilization “makes mass publics more likely to
want democracy and more skillful at getting it.” 
Cognitive mobilization and widespread material and physical security
lead, in turn, to a shift from material values to post-material values.
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Inglehart (1997) defines post-materialist values as emphasizing “individual
self-expression and quality of life concerns.” When materialists dominate a
country’s discourse, public opinion will be concerned with inflation, eco-
nomic growth, and other issues that bear directly on citizens’ material well-
being. Post-materialists, on the other hand, are more concerned with per-
sonal autonomy, environmental issues, and quality of life concerns besides
those directly linked to material possessions.
Inglehart argues that the post-materialist desire for self-expression and
autonomy predisposes them toward democratic institutions and practice.
Post-materialists tend to keep higher standards in evaluating their quality of
life and opportunities for self-expression. Such high standards apply to the
political life as well. Post-materialists are more critical of political elites and
authority, and they are less satisfied with the performance of political insti-
tutions than materialists are. Therefore, post-materialist values should have
a negative relationship with the level of confidence in political institutions
(Inglehart 1997). Given that post-materialists are more critical of and less
respectful of public authority, I expect that post-materialism would have a
negative effect on the level of confidence in public institutions, but no effect
on the level of confidence in civic institutions.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Recently, individual confidence in public and civic institutions has
received increasing attention and has been extensively studied by social sci-
entists. In western democracies, following the lead of Miller (1974) and
Lipset and Schneider (1987), Nye and colleagues (1997) studied the reasons
for declining confidence among American citizens; Klingemann, Fuchs and
colleagues (1995) examined the dynamics of political trust in European
countries, while Norris and colleagues (1999) and Pharr, Putnam and col-
leagues (2000) compared confidence in institutions across countries of estab-
lished democracies. Confidence in institutions among members of new
democracies has been studied by Mishler and Rose (1997, 2000) and
Sztompka (1999). These extensive studies on institutional confidence show
that subjective conditions are important factors in the level of confidence, as
well as the objective performance of institutions. 
In Korea, confidence in government and other public institutions
appeared as a topic for systematic empirical research in the late 1980s. Bae
and Lee (1988) used their own survey research data to examine the determi-
nants and consequences of levels of confidence in government among citi-
zens and college students. They included both individual backgrounds and
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subjective assessments of government performance in their model. Their
study served as the first systematic empirical research on this issue, but
their use of subjective measures of performance rather than objective mea-
sures undermined the reliability of the study. 
Recently, the issue of confidence in institutions garners increasing atten-
tion from social scientists. As Yee (1998) explicated, Putnam (1993) and
Fukuyama (1995) rekindled interest in this issue under the condition of
severe economic crisis. Yee pointed out that Korean society suffers from the
lack of public or institutional trust and from the excess of narrow private
trust based on personal ties (yeon-jul). Oh and Park (2002) dealt with the
methodological issues involved in measurement of confidence in govern-
ment. They recommended using a multiple-item index of confidence
instead of a single-item scale. We followed their recommendation and used
a multiple-item index of confidence in this study.
Both Chang (2002) and Joo (2003) used the World Value Survey data to
systematically investigate the correlates of confidence in political institu-
tions. Chang (2002) analyzed the relationship between social capital and
confidence, but used correlation rather than multiple regression methods.
He found that civic engagement measured as political participation was
negatively related to confidence in both public and civic institutions. He
concluded that a vicious circle between social capital and confidence existed
in Korean society, and therefore increasing social capital failed to promote
confidence. However, in his results, participation in civic organizations had
a positive relationship with confidence. He did not directly test his hypothe-
sis with individual level variables of social capital and confidence. 
Joo (2003) relied on both post-materialism and social capital to explain the
individual level variance in institutional confidence. However, his measure
of post-materialism is problematic. He did not use the measure of post-
materialism developed by Inglehart (1997), but rather used “lack of respect
for authority” as proxy for a post-materialist value orientation. He analyzed
the 1995 data of the World Value Survey and reported that while progres-
sive ideology and social capital are positively related with more confidence
in government, post-materialism has a negative relationship with confi-
dence in government. In this study, I took advantage of full data from 1981
to 1995, as well as additional data from the Institute for Social Development
and Policy Research (ISDPR) social surveys between 1996 and 2003 to com-
pare effects of social capital and post-materialism over time. I used compati-
ble and systematic measures of social capital and post-materialism from
these data. 
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DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS
Data analyzed came from surveys conducted in various years between
1981 and 2003. Two sets of surveys mainly provided data. One is the World
Value Survey, conducted in 1981, 1990, and 1995. The other is Social Surveys
conducted by the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research
(ISDPR) at Seoul National University in 1998, 2001, and 2003.
The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural
and political change. This project is being carried out by an international
network of social scientists, with local funding for each survey. It has con-
ducted representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the
public in more than 65 societies on all six inhabited continents, containing
almost 80 percent of the world’s population. It builds on the European
Values Surveys, first carried out in 1981. A second wave of surveys,
designed for global use, was completed in 1990-1991. A third wave was car-
ried out in 1995-1996, and a fourth wave took place in 1999-2001. South
Korea has participated from the first wave of the survey, and in this study
data from the surveys of 1981, 1990, and 1995 are used.
By comparing these two sets of survey data, one can see the trend of the
changing level of confidence in public and civic institutions. One can also
check how robust the effects of independent variables are across data from
multiple surveys conducted at different time points. Sample sizes of the
World Value Survey data are 970 in 1981, 1251 in 1990, and 1249 in 1995.
After dropping cases with missing variables, the number of cases in the
final data is 478 in 1981, 1104 in 1990, and 1204 in 1995. Sample sizes of the
ISDPR survey data are 800 in 1998, 1520 in 2001, and 1200 in 2003. After
eliminating cases with missing variables, 799 cases are used in the analysis
for 1998, 1519 and 1198 cases are analyzed for 2001 and 2003 respectively.
I secured the dependent variable for this study from respondents’
answers to various questions asking their level of confidence in each type of
institution. The questions were asked in Likert-style scales ranging from one
(lowest) to four or five (highest), depending on the surveys. The World
Value Survey used four-point scales, while ISDPR surveys used five-point
scales. I took the mean score of respondents’ answers to questions asking
their level of confidence in each institution. Confidence in public institu-
tions was calculated from answers to questions about courts, government,
and armed forces. Confidence in civic institutions was calculated from
answers to questions about media, universities, labor unions, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations. 
Two variables for social capital, social trust and social participation, are
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measured as follows. Social trust was measured as a dichotomous variable
representing whether the respondent agreed with the statement, “Most peo-
ple can be trusted.” Social participation was measured by taking the mean
value for questions asking respondents’ level of participating in such orga-
nizations as sports or recreation organizations, political parties, interest
organizations, charity organizations, and non-governmental organizations.
Social participation variables range from one to five, with higher values for
higher levels of social participation.
Post-materialist values were measured as a multiple-item index from a set
of questions asking respondents’ priorities for national goals (for a detailed
description of the measurement process, see Inglehart 1997: 108-130). The
post-materialism index ranges from the value of one, representing material-
ism, to the value of six, representing post-materialism. 
Respondents’ self-assessed ideological orientation is measured and
included in the models for the World Value Survey data. Conservative ori-
entations are measured as one and progressive orientations are measured as
ten in this variable. I expect that progressive respondents would be more
skeptical about the capacity and reliability of public institutions, but more
confident about those of civic institutions. The time spent on the internet is
measured and included in models for the ISDPR data in 2001. Given the
widely-mentioned reality that politically progressive forces utilize the inter-
net as a means of political influence and mobilization, I expect that a person
spending more time on the internet would have less confidence in public
institutions, but would show no difference in confidence in civic institu-
tions. 
As background variables, I controlled for respondents’ age, gender, and
education, measured as the years of schooling. I also controlled for the
amount of monthly household income measured in ten thousand won. I
used multiple regression analyses to test the effects of social capital and cul-
tural values measured at the individual level on the level of confidence in
public and civic institutions held by the individual. I relied on OLS methods
to estimate the regression coefficients of the models. For each survey data,
separate regression models were applied and estimated. 
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the changing levels of confidence in public and civic insti-
tutions. I converted original four and five-point indices into percentages in
order to make them comparable over time. Confidence in public and civic
institutions shows a general tendency of decline. The tendency is more
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emphasized for public institutions. People tend to have more confidence in
civic institutions than in public institutions.
Table 2. shows estimates from a model predicting the level of confidence
in public institutions for the World Value Surveys of 1980, 1990, and 1995. 
In 1980, respondents’ age, education, and post-materialist values are not
measured, and therefore these variables are not included in the model for
1980. The effect of social trust is positive, while the effect of social participa-
tion is negative, and both effects are not significant (p>0.05). The effect of
political ideology is statistically significant (p<0.01), and the more progres-
sive person tends to show lower confidence. Higher household income
tends to lower confidence, and the effect is statistically significant (p<0.01).
The gender effect is statistically not significant (p>0.05). Overall, the model
explains 8.9 percent of the total variance of the data.
In 1990, the effects of social trust and social participation are positive, but
the effects are not statistically significant (p>0.05). The effect of post-materi-
alism is statistically significant (p<0.01), and having post-materialist values
lowers confidence in public institutions. The effect of political ideology is
statistically significant (p<0.01) and the more progressive person tends to
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FIGURE 1. TREND OF CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC AND CIVIC INSTITUTIONS
SOURCES: WORLD VALUE SURVEY (1981, 1990, 1995)
ISDPR SOCIAL SURVEY (1998, 2001, 2003)
show lower confidence. Among the background variables, age, gender, and
education have significant effects (p<0.01). Female respondents show lower
confidence, and younger and highly educated respondents’ confidence lev-
els are lower. After controlling for education, the significance of the income
effect disappears. Of the total variance, 19.1 percent is explained by the
model.
In 1995, the effect of social trust and social participation are statistically
significant (p<0.01), and both variables representing social capital increase
the level of institutional confidence. The effect of post-materialist values is
statistically significant (p<0.01), and respondents with post-materialist val-
ues show a lower level of confidence. The effect of political ideology is sig-
nificant (p<0.05), but the direction is reversed from previous years. Among
the background variables, the effects of age and education are statistically
significant (p<0.01), and young age and a high level of education lower
institutional confidence. Gender and income effects are not statistically sig-
nificant (p>0.05). Overall, 13.5 percent of the variance in confidence level is
explained by the model.
Table 3 shows estimates from models predicting level of confidence in
civic institutions for the World Value Surveys of 1980, 1990, and 1995.
In 1980, as in the model for confidence in public institutions, variables for
age, education, and post-materialism are not measured and therefore not
included in the model. The effect of social trust on confidence is negative
and statistically significant (p<0.01). This result is contrary to the result from
INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE IN KOREA 177
TABLE 2. ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (WORLD
VALUE SURVEY)
1980 1990 1995
coefficient S. E coefficient S. E coefficient S. E
estimate estimate estimate
Intercept 3.458 0.083 3.167 0.096 2.736 0.109
Gender(female=1) 0.057 0.058 -0.089 0.035 0.006 0.030
Age 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.001
Education -0.100 0.015 -0.093 0.015
Household Income -0.059 0.011 -0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.008
Social Trust 0.046 0.059 0.028 0.036 0.094 0.032
Social Participation -0.213 0.173 0.066 0.089 0.195 0.060
Political Ideology -0.050 0.012 -0.044 0.008 0.014 0.007
Post-materialism -0.075 0.015 -0.058 0.014
R2 0.089 0.191 0.135
N 478 1104 1204
the model for confidence in public institutions. Social participation, another
variable related to social capital, has a positive effect on confidence in civic
institutions, but it is not statistically significant (p>0.05). Progressive ideolo-
gy has a positive effect on confidence in civic institutions, but the effect is
not significant (p>0.05). Higher household income is negatively related to
confidence in civic institutions (p<0.01). The effect of gender is not statisti-
cally significant (p>0.05). Overall, the model explains 8.9 percent of the total
variance in the data.
In 1990, the effect of social trust remains negative, but statistical signifi-
cance disappears (p>0.1). Social participation has a positive but not signifi-
cant effect on confidence in civic institutions (p>0.1). Post-materialist values
and progressive ideology make no significant difference in the level of con-
fidence in civic institutions (p>0.1). Among the background variables, the
effects of education and household income are statistically significant
(p<0.01), and a high level of education and household income are related
with low levels of confidence in civic institutions. Gender and age effects
are not statistically significant (p>0.1). The proportion of the total variance
explained by the model is only 3.8 percent. 
In 1995, social trust has a significant positive effect on confidence in civic
institutions (p<0.05). The effect of social participation is positive but not sta-
tistically significant (p>0.1). Post-materialist values and progressive ideolo-
gy have no significant effects. Among the background variables, gender,
age, and education have significant effects on confidence in civic institutions
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TABLE 3. ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF CONFIDENCE IN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS (WORLD
VALUE SURVEY)
1980 1990 1995
coefficient S. E coefficient S. E coefficient S. E
estimate estimate estimate
Intercept 3.260 0.084 2.892 0.095 2.756 0.104
Gender(female=1) 0.115 0.059 0.005 0.034 0.063 0.028
Age 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001
Education -0.043 0.015 -0.034 0.014
Household Income -0.067 0.011 -0.026 0.007 0.001 0.007
Social Trust -0.039 0.013 -0.010 0.008 0.019 0.007
Social Participation 0.037 0.060 0.003 0.035 0.005 0.030
Political Ideology 0.156 0.175 0.064 0.087 0.117 0.057
Post-materialism 0.013 0.015 0.007 0.013
R2 0.089 0.038 0.023
N 478 1104 1204
(p<0.05). 
Table 4 presents estimates from models predicting confidence in public
institutions for ISDPR surveys of 1998, 2001, and 2003. 
In 1998, the effects of social trust on confidence in public institutions is
positive and statistically significant (p<0.01). The effect of social participa-
tion is negative but not statistically significant (p>0.1). Respondents with
post-materialist values tend to show a lower level of confidence in public
institutions, and the effect is statistically significant (p<0.01). None of the
background variables have statistically significant effects on confidence in
public institutions. Overall, the model explains 7.7 percent of the total vari-
ance in the data.
In 2001, the effects of social trust and social participation on confidence in
public institutions are both significant (p<0.01) and positive. Being a post-
materialist lowers the level of confidence in public institutions. Among the
background variables, age and gender have significant effects (p<0.01).
Aged people and women tend to show more confidence in public institu-
tions. Socio-economic background variables such as education or income do
not show significant effects; 5.2 percent of the total variance is explained by
the model. 
In 2003, social trust and social participation have positive effects on confi-
dence in public institutions, but only the effect of social trust is significant
(p<0.01). The effect of post-materialist values is negative and significant
(p<0.05). In 2003, the time spent on the internet was added to the model. Its
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TABLE 4. ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (ISDPR
SOCIAL SURVEY)
1998 2001 2003
coefficient S. E coefficient S. E coefficient S. E
estimate estimate estimate
Intercept 2.273 0.222 1.732 0.179 2.598 0.171
Gender(female=1) 0.042 0.054 0.120 0.038 -0.023 0.040
Age 0.004 0.028 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.002
Education -0.006 0.010 0.004 0.007 -0.022 0.008
Household Income 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Social Trust 0.258 0.041 0.171 0.031 0.068 0.021
Social Participation -0.101 0.094 0.282 0.065 0.061 0.077
Post-materialism -0.109 0.023 -0.031 0.018 -0.046 0.021
Internet Use Time 0.000 0.000
R2 0.077 0.052 0.06
N 799 1519 1198
effect, however, is not significant. Among other variables, age and education
have significant effects on confidence in public institutions (p<0.01). Aging
tends to increase confidence, while education tends to lessen confidence.
Overall, 6 percent of the variance is explained by the model. 
Table 5 presents estimates from a model predicting confidence in civic
institutions for ISDPR surveys of 1998, 2001, and 2003. 
In 1998, social trust has a positive and significant (p<0.01) effect on confi-
dence in civic institutions. The effect of social participation and post-materi-
alism are not statistically significant (p>0.05). None of background variables
significantly affect confidence in civic institutions. Overall, the model
explains only 2.1 percent of the total variance.
In 2001, social participation has a significant (p<0.01) and positive effect
on confidence in civic institutions. The effects of social capital is positive but
not statistically significant. Post-materialist values have a negative and non-
significant effect on confidence in civic institutions. Among the background
variables, only gender has a significant effect (p<0.01), and female respon-
dents show higher levels of confidence. Overall, 2 percent of the variance is
explained by the model. 
In 2003, social capital has a significant (p<0.05) and positive effect on con-
fidence in civic institutions. Effects of social participation and post-material-
ism are not significant. Time spent on internet use has no significant effect
on confidence in civic institutions. Among background variables, education
affects confidence in civic institutions significantly (p<0.05) in the negative
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TABLE 5. ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF CONFIDENCE IN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS (ISDPR
SOCIAL SURVEY)
1998 2001 2003
coefficient S. E coefficient S. E coefficient S. E
estimate estimate estimate
Intercept 2.824 0.196 2.605 0.177 3.229 0.156 
Gender(female=1) -0.003 0.048 0.109 0.038 -0.046 0.036 
Age -0.008 0.025 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Education -0.007 0.009 0.000 0.007 -0.016 0.007 
Household Income 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Social Trust 0.126 0.036 0.058 0.031 0.036 0.018 
Social Participation 0.102 0.083 0.151 0.064 -0.099 0.070 
Post-materialism -0.010 0.021 -0.023 0.017 -0.011 0.019 
Internet Use Time 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.021 0.020 0.012
N 799 1519 1198
direction. Altogether, the model explains only 1.2 percent of the variance. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The results from regression models show that social trust and social par-
ticipation, two aspects of social capital, tend to have positive effects on con-
fidence in both public and civic institutions. Significance of effects varies by
year and is more pronounced for public institutions. Post-materialist values
have a negative effect on confidence in public institutions, but have no sig-
nificant effect on confidence in civic institutions. Despite some variance in
statistical significance of the effects, the relationships between independent
and dependent variables appear consistent across surveys. Therefore, it can
be stated that confidence in institutions increases with social capital, but
declines with post-materialism. 
Overall fit of the models is not very good. Only two out of nine models
explain more than 10 percent of the variance in confidence. Explanatory
power of the model is especially weak for civic institutions. However, the
situation is similar for other studies on institutional confidence in other soci-
etal contexts (Norris 1999; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001; Joo 2003). We can
only say that much unexplained variance remains in institutional confi-
dence. 
If social capital and post-materialism affect confidence in institutions at
the individual level, would changes in the level of institutional confidence
result from changing levels of social capital and post-materialism, if we look
at the trend over time? In other words, how much do social capital and
post-materialism explain the decline in confidence that we have seen in
Figure 1? Post-materialism became more prevalent between 1981 and 2001.
Recently, however, post-materialism shows slight decline. Therefore, we can
say that the growing influence of post-materialism accounts for some of the
decline in confidence. Social trust consistently declines over the period
between 1981 and 2003. However, the level of social participation is on the
rise, especially for the period between 1981 and 2001. Therefore, the effect of
social capital seems mixed in that while rising social participation has a pos-
itive effect on confidence, declining social trust has the opposite negative
effect.
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